When I listen to what people say about the war of NATO against
Yugoslavia, and of the Yugoslav regime against the Albanian
population of Kosov@[1], be it on various mailing lists or in
personal conversations with people, it is striking how insecure many
seem to feel. Apparently many activists are having difficulties to
remain true to even the most elementary principles of long-standing
leftist politics, in a time in which a war cannot any longer be
interpreted simply as imperialist/antiimperialist - here the ugly
imperialists, there the brave liberation fighters. It seems to me
that it is not those principles that have to be given up. Just like
ever before, people and the lives they live should come first,
before big-time politics. The point remains to develop, in
solidarity, resistance against the attacks on our autonomy, without
making differences among us invisible in the process. The point is
still to see through discursive maneuvers of distraction and to base
our analysis on an understanding of economic and social mechanisms
of power. It is rather the less conscious characteristics of leftist
and autonomist political practice that need rethinking.
Against ethnicizing!
The reflex of some antiimperialist activists, when they perceive
efforts towards independence as "liberation movements", to consider
these efforts to be legitimate and worthy of support, seems to lead
to a dead end in the case of Kosov@. Perhaps the wish to identify
with the enemies of a cunning and reckless power player like
Slobodan Milosevic has led some, for some time at least, to close
their eyes on the racist tendencies of a KLA (Kosova Liberation
Army, also UCK, "Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves"), or at least
tendencies towards "ethnic" separation. Others have preferred to
remain silent on this point, in the general uncertainty of the
moment. The former, among them one part of the editors of the Info
International program of Radio LoRa in Zurich, have at least had the
merit to be involved with what was going on in Kosov@ and to launch
discussions about it (making contact with KLA people in Zurich in
the process), at a time at which other media barely paid any
attention to the KLA. When the NATO attacks started and it became
clearer how the KLA put itself unconditionally at the service of
NATO strategies, some of the early advocates of a solidarity with
the KLA used the opportunity to critically reassess their position.
Others, even among those usually very critical of the state and
media (I'm surprised, for instance, about the declaration of an
anarchist friend on an Eastern European mailing list), have flirted
with the line of argument about preventing a "humanitarian
catastrophe". This means they have walked into the trap set up by
NATO by creating facts on the ground and then feigning to offer
solutions. I was outright shocked by the machist and aggressive
statements of some European and US-American net activists (e.g., on
the nettime mailing list) as a reaction to e-mail diaries reporting
from a personal point of view on the bombings in Belgrade, Novi Sad
and Kraljevo - although I do see how such personal accounts can be
put to use for propagandist purposes. In any event, I would like to
deal with this by trying to contextualize such accounts, and not by
suppressing them. Maybe out of a feeling of insecurity for having to
argue politically on unusually unfamiliar terrain, some of the net
activists emphatically embrace an anti-Milosevic position that in
its negligent way borders on anti-Serb racism.
The fact that on the
other hand a group with a more streamlined political stance, like
the Revolutionärer Aufbau Schweiz (Revolutionary Build-Up
Switzerland), manages to write a leaflet against the NATO war
without mentioning even one word about the refugees fleeing from
Milosevic's campaign, should probably not come as a surprise. This
position is just as fatally based on a simplified understanding of
imperialism (in the latter case, probably adopted for tactical
reasons) - once again there is only one bad guy, even if this time
it is not Milosevic but NATO, and implicitly the Kosov@ Albanians
collaborating with NATO. It seems to me that all these positions are
evidence of a weak point in our political praxis. A more in-depth
inquiry into the political developments in Kosov@ that points out
the complexity of economic and power strategic causes of a social
conflict and the willfully forced ethnicizing of the conflict is
something that I have seen bits and pieces of, but usually discussed
in a limited circle of people.
The "facts on the ground" for which Slobodan Milosevic,
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the KLA leadership (but also Ibrahim Rugova
in his own more discreet ways) have, each for their own reasons,
worked hard for years, are widely accepted. These "facts" consist in
the perception that the conflict stems from age-old "ethnic" feuds
and is so much ingrained in people that it is impossible to live
together. In view of the crushing weight of "history", even from a
leftist point of view the only thing to do then is to call for the
"ethnic" separation - perceived as the only way to defuse the
smoldering conflict - to be achieved by peaceful means through
negotiations. This procedure has been demonstrated in the case of
Bosnia in which the Dayton Agreement was reached under US
sponsorship. But - it was not possible to implement the "ethnic"
separation agreed upon there without violent relocations and
massacres, since the people would not let themselves be moved
without resistance. "Srebrenica" was in this sense a prerequisite
for the implementation of Dayton - part of the plan, so to
speak.
It seems vital to me to break out of the discourse about an
"ethnic" conflict. To achieve this, we must concentrate our efforts
on the one hand on laying bare the (economic and power-strategic)
causes of the conflict. A central aspect herein is the high
indebtedness of Yugoslavia and especially Serbia after decades of
preferential access to international credit lines, due to the
privileged position of Yugoslavia during the "Cold War". The
International Monetary Fund's (IMF) policy of debt collection
thereby leads to an intensification of the strategies of
exploitation of the Yugoslav government, which in its turn gives
rise to social struggles against this exploitation. The second part
of our efforts must concentrate on exposing the mechanisms of
ethnicizing, and thus the strategies for diverting the attention
from those causes. Of course this is easier done in a (Western
European) context in which the people have a certain distance to the
events, than in the circle of those who are already exposed to an
attack defined in "ethnic", i.e., racist terms and immediately need
to react to it and develop strategies of survival against this
attack. But even in Yugoslavia, in the context of war, some people
manage to consistently speak of the conflict in such a way as to
expose the absurdity of the logic of war. In (Ex-) Yugoslavia there
is a long tradition of resistance against "ethnic" dividing lines
imposed by the governments. From the "Women in Black" and
conscientious objectors' initiatives, e-mail lists like the
anarchist ex-yu-a-lista and attack[2] all the way to various
feminist groups. This is whom we must refer to when we want to build
up solidarity with people in Yugoslavia. Such solidarity is possible
and does not require taking a stand for one or the other parties to
the war. In the case of Kosov@ it is slightly more difficult than in
Bosnia to refer to existing projects and contacts, since the
networking between Kosov@ Albanians and other people in Yugoslavia
is less developed. For instance, there does not seem, in Kosov@, to
be an anarchist movement visible to the outside - and the anarchist
movement is an important pillar of anti-national politics in Bosnia,
Croatia and Serbia. There are nevertheless contacts, be it in
feminist circles, in the peace movement or in other contexts.
Together with the people from these contexts I see the possibility
to develop a common anti-national, "leftist" position.
It would be especially interesting to develop, in a common
process, an understanding of how the attractiveness of various
nationalist discourses, myths and loyalties is constructed for
people in Switzerland, in Germany and in Yugoslavia. How can
existing certainties that currently contribute to the front-building
and legitimization for NATO, the KLA and/or Milosevic, be
undermined? Some ideas in this direction can be gleaned from the
"Materialien für einen neuen Antiimperialismus"[3] Nr. 6 (Materials
for a New Antiimperialism). This is a discussion I would like to
have with people from Yugoslavia, and in the process I want to take
the fears and hopes of those people seriously. I think it is easy to
point to the danger of various legitimizing constructions, but it is
much harder to debate those questions with people who have
appropriated these legitimizing constructions (often in incomplete
and fragmentary ways) under the pressure of bombs and/or massacres.
Since these legitimizing constructions are part of a strategy of
survival, we must also try, in a collective process among
radical/emancipatory activists, to develop new strategies of
survival or point out existing alternatives. This process not only
applies to Yugoslavia and the front-building there. In mixed
(East-West) e-mail fora like nettime or syndicate, we also find a
dynamic of front-building that we need to understand and
undermine.
How we speak about the war
In attempting to delegitimize the war to all sides, it seems to
me that in a first step it is not so much "historical reality" that
counts and should be researched in full detail in order to oppose
"facts" to the "propaganda". Maybe it is more important, for now, to
look at the tactical question of assessing the effect of a given
discourse. The reason I say this is not that I find a historical
understanding useless or unimportant, but because in my view
propaganda can be pursued with quite correct and confirmed "facts" -
for instance, a war can be legitimized using massacres that have
actually taken place. It would seem dangerous to me, for instance,
to put much emphasis on the probability that a massacre like the one
in Racak was a fake. A discussion on this may be interesting only in
the context of investigating the requirements of a media war. A
discussion that could probably lay bare the motives for inventing a
massacre. It seems difficult to avoid, however, that the emphatic
denial of this or other massacres contribute to the discourse of
those who generally deny the very existence of massacres and in this
way attempt to paint one of the parties to the war as the "Good" or
at least the "Innocent".
Many of the arguments that can be given against the war turn out
not to be unproblematic in one way or other. A widely used line of
argument compares the Yugoslav policies towards Kosov@ Albanians to
the attacks by the Turkish state on the life and identity of Kurds
that have been going on for many years. It asks why NATO is not
bombing Turkey, if it considers Human Rights so important. In its
outrage about different sets of standards being applied to Turkey
and Yugoslavia, this comparison takes the humanimilitarist
legitimizing construction of NATO seriously. By pointing out that
Turkey is not being bombed, the alleged motive of a humanitarian
intervention is at once questioned and reaffirmed. Nevertheless I
think that Kurdistan can be brought into the discussion in a
different context, without legitimizing the motives given for the
NATO attacks. We can do this by emphasizing the interests of Turkey
as a NATO state to be perceived by the world public as being on the
side of the "Good Guys" - on the side of those who enforce Human
Rights. Among other things, the news coverage of the NATO bombings
diverts the attention of the public from the gigantic campaign of
repression the Turkish state is currently waging against Kurds with
increased intensity.
Similarly, claiming that NATO, through its "autonomous decision"
to attack Yugoslavia, has booted out the UN and OSCE - the
"legitimate actors" of the search for a "peaceful solution" - and
thus broken international law, bears some danger. I do not only
speak of the fact that it may sound strange if from an autonomist,
radical leftist position one speaks in defense of structures that
belong to the realm of big politics. Pragmatically, maybe one could
take it that these institutions act as an opposite pole to NATO, and
aim to strengthen them against powerful NATO. It is, however, only
true to a limited extent that the UN/OSCE are an opposite pole to
NATO. This became clear, among other things, from the espionage work
done by the OSCE observers in preparation for the NATO attacks.[4]
On the one hand, the UN elite's interests give rise to a strategy of
"survival", of retaining its power in view of the NATO attacks
started without regard to UN competence in the matter. Thus in a
first phase Kofi Annan condemned the single-handed approach of NATO.
But while the NATO leadership aims at making Yugoslavia (with or
without Milosevic in power) submit to its will, at the same time it
follows a strategy of first showing the UN managers who is the
master and reducing their options, before courting them with offers
for a renewed participation in the process - at NATO's conditions.
Kofi Annan at least seems to be playing along already. In this way
the transnational institutions legitimize one another - despite
power games among each other. They are reminiscent of the good old
interplay between the good-cop-bad-cop duo of police interrogations,
inspiring confidence and fear all at once. In the new NATO strategic
concept that has recently been presented to the public, a possible
future relation between UN and NATO is formulated - the UN should
once and for all give the go-ahead for NATO interventions outside
NATO territory.
Also, speaking of the incompetence of the decision-makers or
referring to the sexual life of one of them contributes to
legitimizing the war by depoliticizing the events, turning them into
a spectacle and ignoring the existing interests. It is probable that
a strategy of escalation might not remain under the full control
even of the escalating strategists over the complete course of
events, and some of the consequences of the NATO attacks may be
unwanted and maybe even unexpected. But one thing is certain - it is
not the failure of diplomacy that has led to NATO attacks, but the
success of the escalation diplomacy. The now famous Annex B of the
Kosovo Interim Agreement[5] of Rambouillet, signed by the Kosov@
Albanian leadership under the pressure and propaganda efforts of the
US diplomacy, was meant to turn all of Rest-Yugoslavia into a NATO
protectorate. It was definitely not out of diplomatic incompetence
that it was conceived such that the Yugoslav leadership would under
no circumstances be able to sign it.
I rather like the tactical move of those who claim there is a
secret agreement between Milosevic and NATO representatives. There
is no need for this to be real, and the claim is not all that
serious. The real importance of it is to point out that Milosevic is
one of the main beneficiaries of the NATO attacks, and that NATO,
the KLA and Milosevic need each other for legitimizing each other's
war strategies, and that all three parties are united in a
patriarchal-lifedestroying showdown against the Serbian and Albanian
population. Sprayers in Belgrade said it in a nutshell. "Slobo, du
Clinton!"[6], Boris Buden of Bastard/Arkzin quotes a Belgrade
graffito. Beyond the general interest in imposing the logic of war,
a common interest between the Yugoslav leadership and the
transnational power structures, symbolized by William Clinton, can
be traced to their division of labor in pressing added value out of
the majority of the Yugoslav population - with the aim of collecting
the debt.
The interests involved in this war
Quite possibly it may be a fundamentally unsatisfactory endeavor
to inquire into the motives of "big politics" behind the escalation
of the conflict in Kosov@. None of the personalities involved is
likely to share their innermost thoughts with us. What then could be
the aim of juggling with assumptions and circumstantial evidence?
Any interpretation of events carries with it traces of its
intention. Mine is to explore a discourse that does not refer to
"ethnic" criteria but considers ethnicizing as a power strategy, as
a vehicle for more material interests. The criminological search for
a motive may bear the danger of ending in conspiracy theories. I
think that I can (maybe) elude this by considering the interests
(motives) of the various parties of "big politics" involved as
heterogeneous and, for instance, seeing NATO not as a block but
exploring the dynamic and the interaction between the politics of
the USA, Germany and others.
This dynamic stems from the fact that said powers have some
common interests indeed, but those interests can be too similar - in
the sense of a competition for spheres of influence. A strong motive
for the USA, but also for the Netherlands and England, is
maintaining NATO as a hegemonic military power. For the USA the main
interest is to perpetuate the US role as the protector of the
European post-war order. For the Netherlands and England the
presence of the USA is desirable for counterbalancing German or
rather German-French dominance in EU structures. Germany and even
more so France do indeed have an interest in the continued existence
of NATO, but not as a hegemonic power that restricts them in their
power-strategic options. In their view, NATO should be cut back to
an alliance among others, alongside EUropean structures that allow
EUrope under the leadership of Germany and France a certain autonomy
from US-American interests.
In order to save a NATO that has become quite useless after the
Cold War, NATO needs a war in which it can prove that it is needed.
This, however, does not yet explain why this war is waged against
Yugoslavia. In this the motives of the various powers probably
differ. An interesting point - only in the German discussion, along
with that in Austria and in German-language areas of Switzerland, is
Germany perceived and described as an imperialist power pushing
towards the south-east. The investment policy of Germany since 1989
has been better known for its orientation towards Russian markets
and for a relative disinterest in the Balkans. Is the emphasis on
German imperialist efforts by some activists in Germany shaped by an
anti-German[7] overrated perception of "oneself" (all bad things
come from Germany)? Or is rather a lack of information about the ins
and outs of the German foreign policy in other languages responsible
for the omissions regarding Germany in discussions outside the
German-language area? Some indications (the tip of an iceberg?) of
German interests and power games do exist. Most widely known are the
diplomatic initiatives of Hans-Dietrich Genscher in favor of the
international recognition of the independence of Slovenia and
Croatia that provided (unintentionally?) substantial help to
Milosevic's strategy of clinging to power, based on ethnicizing
social questions. Already in the first phase of dislocating the
Yugoslav state structure by means of war the demonizing of Serbs was
accompanied by common interests of the German foreign and the
Yugoslav domestic politics - much like today between NATO and the
Yugoslav central government. A point which received less attention
than Genscher's Yugoslavia politics but has nevertheless found its
way into non-German media is some evidence that the KLA has been
supported, in an early phase, by the German Bundesnachrichtendienst
(BND - Federal Information Service) and other German secret
services, and was armed by German institutions against the will of
the US-American CIA.[8]
In any event, the escalation strategy in its final phase seems to
have taken place under US leadership. It may be difficult to find
out whether the US government was pushed to take over by the facts
created on the ground by German efforts towards an escalation, in
order to avert an excessive EUropean autonomy, or whether the USA
took steps towards making a diplomatic solution impossible due to
its own interests in the disintegration of what was left of
Yugoslavia. In any case, the US government came to the conclusion
that a war under NATO/US leadership worked more effectively towards
maintaining its influence than diplomatic attempts at defusing the
war preparations pushed ahead by German and Yugoslav policies.
In an effort to explore the interests of various powers, it seems
appropriate to me to start out with the observed consequences of the
NATO attacks and to try to imagine who might benefit from those
consequences, who might have accepted them grudgingly and who will
clearly suffer from them. I do not imagine that every single
consequence can be assigned to a willful strategy. But I do think
that most of the consequences were very easy to predict and may
therefore, in the view of one or the other actor and under the given
circumstances, have contributed to making the escalation strategy
attractive or, on the contrary, to raising skepticism about such a
strategy.
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